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Wben the war stopped, my father and little sister and I went back to 
Urakami (suburb of N agasaki)-although there wasn't much left of it. One 
day in October an order from the school was posted: "All pupils of Yama-
zato Grade School will assemble immediately in the school yard!" I went 
right to school. There were three teachers and thirty pupils in the yard. 
Twenty..five teachers and about 1200 pupils had died. Another teacher and 
about 300 pupils didn't turn up; they were out sick on account of wounds or 
atomic sickness. There had been about 60 of us in my class, but only four 
turned up. My own teacher was too overcome to speak. He just looked at us 
and dismissed us. 
-Nagai Takashi, WE OF NAGASAKI, New York, P. 28 
The H -bomb appears on the public horizon as a probably attainable 
goal. If successful, radioactive poisoning' of the atmosphere, and hence anni-
hilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of technical 
possibilities. 
-Albert Einstein, THE H·BOMB, New York, P. 14 
I assume that the people of Russia, very much like the people of the 
United States, are anxious to survive, to stay alive, to try to make an end 
to warfare. I assume they would rather have the resources of Russia not 
turned into tanks, ships, guns and bombs, but into those things attached to 
the home which raise the standards of living of the people of Russia. 
-Senator Millard E. Tydings, in the Senate, 2/ 6/ 50 
The average citizen has more at stake in disarmament than in any other 
proposal for domestic or foreign policy. Disarmament will reduce his taxes, 
it will reduce international tension and stop the drift toward war, and it may 
provide a basis in mutual agreement for the mutual trust and understanding 
that are necessary for lasting peace. 
Therefore, we should be grateful to any group of citizens that attempts 
to study the complex problem of disarmament and we should be glad of their 
help as we try to think this problem through for ourselves. 
To Chicago's Northside Committee for Peaceful Alternatives, we owe 
a debt for doing the spade work that resulted in this Disarmament Guide. 
They have done a cool and clear-headed job, with only one bias, a bias for 
peace. 
PREFACE 
Robert J. Havighurst 
Chairman of the Executive Board, 
Committee for Peaceful Alternatives 
One.fifth of our national income now goes for military spending (Chi. 
cago Daily News, 3/7/52). For the period from the start of the Korean war 
to June 30, 1953, the Administration has received or requested $174,000,000,-
000 for military purposes, equivalent to $1165 for each man, woman and 
child in the U.S. (New York Times, 4/20/52). At this rate, in two more years 
we will have reached the amount spent during the whole of World War TI, 
330 billion dollars. This while there is peace. Nor have we yet undertaken 
the additional cost required to shift our industrial centers in preparation 
for an A-bomb war, estimated at 300 billions. (Wm. L. Laurence, The Hell 
Bomb, N.Y., P. 79) 
Our allies, notably England and France, are at the stage of economic 
crisis, as a result of our insistence that they re-ann (AP report, Chicago Sun-
Times, 6/12/52). 
Meanwhile, the more we arm, the more we feel insecure. Describing 
the effect of the H-bomb, which they predict the Russians will have as soon 
as we will, the Alsops paint the following picture: 
The character of this weapon which is in prospect goes beyond what 
the normal human imagination can comprehend. The two-megaton 
bomb will achieve total destruction in an area of iust under 100 
miles. In its single explosion, a whole vast megalopolis, a great mod· 
ern capital, can be wiped from the face of the earth. 
-Chicago Sun·Times, 6/ 19/ 52 
Hand in hand with lowered living standards and the constant dread 
of annihilation, our liberties are restricted to meet the demands of the cold 
war: 
Consider, too, the restriction on freedom already brought about by 
the atomic bomb by its pressures upon us to accept loyal.ty checks, 
espionage counter measures, and widening areas of official secrecy. 
For a preview of the future if the armaments race continues, multi· 
ply the effect of these factors by something like 1,000 times-to al. 
low for the 1,000 times greater energy release of the hydrogen bomb 
-and if you are candid and realistic, I believe you will find it is 
difficult indeed to see a dominant role for freedom in such a picture. 
-SeJ\ator Brien McMahon, before the Senate, 2/2/50 
Little wonder then that viewing this ominous trend, men from all 
walks of life have issued grave warnings: 
We must try to put an end to the arms race before it puts an end 
to us. 
-Gov. Adlai Stevenson, Chicago Sun-Times, 6/ 15/ 52 
There are two obvious places we could go. One is to war. The other 
is broke. There must be another alternative. There must be some 
way to learn to live with Russia. 
-Henry Ford II, u.s. News and World Report, 1/15/ 52 
There is an alternative-it is to end the cold war by settlement of the 
issues which inflame it, and to end the arms race by agreement for univer-
sal (all nations) and total (all weapons) disarmament. 
11his guide will deal mainly with disarmament, but since the impasse 
on that question is a reflection of the deadlock on all issues in the cold war, 
it will be necessary to deal briefly with the Administration's basic approach 




THE UN TACKLES DISARMAMENT 
• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The UN has been debating disarmament proposals since 1946, when 
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Committee for Conventional Arms 
were established. 
During the summer of 1951, the U.S. and USSR exchanged messages 
which expressed agreement in principle: 
Whereas the Congress reaffirm its policy I ••• to achieve universal 
control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and 
reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate 
safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and eva· 
lion' ••• 
-Joint resolution of the U.S. Senate and House trans· 
mitted by President Truman to the USSR, 7/ 7/ 51 
The USSR replied: 
It is the duty of all peace-loving nations staunchly to pursue a pol. 
icy of preventing war and preserving peace, not to allow an arma-
ments race, to secure a reduction of armaments and the prohibition 
of atomic weapons, with control to enforce it ••• 
Nicholai Shvernik, President of the USSR, 8/ 6/51 
Disarmament underwent a full dress debate at the Sixth (paris) Ses-
sion with each side introducing !=jets of proposals. Overriding the opposition 
of the USSR, the Western plan was adopted by the UN; the only part which 
found unanimous agreement was the proposal for combining the two disarma 
ment committees-atomic energy and conventional arms-into one Disarma· 
ment Commission. 
REVISED WESTE'RN PLAN (11·19·51) 
Sets u.p new Disarmament Commission which is to draft treaties to 
be guided ' by the following principles: 
a) Objective: "to bring about the limitation and balanced reduction 
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of all armed forces and all armaments to levels adequate for defense but not 
for aggression and to achieve effective international control to insure the 
prohibition of atomic weapons." 
b) "Progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis" of 
all arms and armed forces, and "based on effective international inspection" 
to insure accuracy. This is to be a "first and indispensable step in carrying 
out the disarmament program." 
c) Basis for control of atomic weapons shall continue to be the Ba-
ruch Plan, which provides for international ownership of atomic facilities 
and eliminates the right of veto by the five permanent members of the Se-
curity Council on disputes arising from enforcement of the plan. 
d) The Disarmament Commission shall begin its work within 30 days 
and when part of its program is ready for submission, a conference of all 
states shall be convened to consider proposals for a draft treaty. 
USSR PLAN (11·16·51) 
a) "Unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment 
of strict control of the implementation of this prohibition." Implementation , 
by convention to be drafted by Feb. 1, 1952. 
b) 11he permanent members of the Securty Council (the Big Five) 
reduce arms and armed forces "by one-third during the course of one year." 
,c) Within one month all countries shall present "data on the status 
of their armaments and armed forces" including atomic weapons and mili-
tary bases on foreign territory." 
d) Set up international control agency within the framework of the 
Security Council to control implementation of these decisions. 
On Jan. 12, 1952, Mr. Vishinsky submitted to the Political and Security 
Committee of the General Assembly, a further proposal that the USSR would 
agree to put into effect the prohibition of atomic weapons "at the same time 
as the whole system of international control will have been placed into op-
eration," and to continuous, as against periodic, inspection of atomic fa-
cilities. 
RECENT ~ROPO'SALS 
On May 28, 1952, the new Disarmament Commission received from the 
U.S., Britain and France, proposals for an "over-all numerical limitation on 
all armed forces." The plan suggested a ceiling between 1,000,000 and 1,500,-
000 each for China, the Soviet Union and the U.S., and between 700,000 and 
800,000 each for France and Britain. As shown during the course of the de-
bate, this was intended as a counter-proposal to the USSR plan for a one-
third cut. The USSR delegate, Mr. Malik, called upon the three Western 
powers to detail the nature of the proposed reduction and specifically wheth-
er it applied to naval and air personnel as well as ground forces. By his 
questions, Mr. Malik indicated that if the Western proposal was tied in with 
simultaneous adoption of proposals for "reduction of armaments and the 
prohibition of the atomic weapon and all other types of weapons of mass de-
struction," a basis was offered for fruitfJ11 negotiation. 
On Aug. 12, a supplementary proposal was presented by the "three 
powers" for a five power conference to seek tentative agreemnt Cln: a) the 
distribution by categories of the armed forces within the agreed numerical 
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limitations; b) the types and quantities of arms which they would consider 
necessary to support permitted armed forces; and c) the elimination of all 
armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being 
understood that all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be 
placed under effective international control to ensure its peaceful use only. 
(UN Bulletin, 7/1/52 and 8/15/52). 
THE PARIS P'RO'POSA'LS···DIFFERENCES 
A profound distrust of motive breathes through the speeches of both 
sides. President Truman's address of Nov. 7, 1951, clearly sug~~ts that he is 
preoccupied with fear of Communist aggression; and Mr. Vi$hinsky indicates 
equal suspicion that America will use its atomic superiority to launch an at-
tack from its air bases around the USSR. 
Certain of the differences between the proposals stem from the inher-
ent complexity of the pro·blem. It is hard to tailor proposals to fit both 
atomic and conventional arms. And within one area-atomic disarmament-
there are difficult choices to make. Chester I. Barnard, President of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, who helped draft the Baruch plan, summed them 
up as follows: 
1. Shall an international authority take ownership of the raw 
materials (uranium and thorium) and operate aU potentially danger-
ous projects in atomic energy, or shall each nation develop its own 
atomic energy program, with in.ternational inspectors to see that it 
does not make atomic weapons? 
2. Shall atomic disarmament proceed in a series of stages, or 
shall atomic bombs be outlawed and existing stockpiles be d!'stroyed 
by immediate agreement? 
3. Shall charges and penalties against a nation accused of vio-
lating the control. agreement ultimately be decided by a maiority 
or by a unanimous vote of the UN Security Council? 
-Scientific American, Nov. 1949 
These questions merit closer analysis. 
Question. 1. The U.S. for six years, since its introduction into the UN, 
has adhered to the Baruch plan (sometimes called the UN Majority Plan), 
which calls for international ownership and management of atomic facilities. 
The USSR, instead, has proposed national ownership with a system of inspec-
tion by an international control agency under the UN. On October 23, 1950, 
Mr. Vishinsky described his view of the inspection process and proposed: 
that the international control agency shall be entitled to: 
a) Have access to all enterprises for extracting, production and 
stockpiling of atomic raw materials as well as exploration of atomic 
energy, 
b) The right of observation in atomic energy enterprises with 
production operations to the extent necessary for control over util~­
zation. of atomic materials and energy, 
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c) The right to carry out measures concerning weighing, verifi-
cation, and analysis of various kinds of atomic raw materials. 
d) The right to demand from the government of any state and 
to verify all kinds of information on activities of atomic energy en-
terprises. 
This inspection system is to be directed, according to the USSR, by 
an international control agency acting by a simple majority (no veto power). 
The U.S., on the other hand, has taken the position, as stated just recently 
by Secretary Acheson, 1/ 16/52: 
It is perfectly clear that no system of inspection alone, be it periodic 
or continuous, can ensure the effective prohibition of atomic weap· 
ons. A system of control based upon these safeguards (the Baruch 
plan) is the only one so far devised that can be both workable and 
effectiv·e. We are prepared to examine any other proposals that 
might be equally or more workable or effective. 
-Dept. of State Release No. 39 
Question 2. The U.S. has favored the establishment of a system of 
control by stages; the final stage, when approved by U.S. con'stitutional 
processes, is to be the conversion of the stockpile of A-bombs to civiliap 
use. As a "first and indispensable" stage all arms, atomic and conventional, 
shall be disclosed and verified starting with the least sensitive and continu-
ing until atomic weapons are disclosed. The U.S. has also stated that a prior 
condition for disarmament is the settlement of the Korean conflict and other 
political issues. (Sec'y of State Acheson, Speech to UN, 11/8/ 51) 
The USSR favors the simultaneous prohibition, and adoption of a con-
trol system over such prohibition, of atomic weapons. In criticism of the Ba-
ruch plan of "stages" it has pointed out that there was no binding commit-
ment to carry out the last stage for which all the others are preparations. 
It has further opposed the "stages" idea on the grounds that it would result 
in the indefinite postponement of information on the most destructive and 
dangerous arms. Instead it proposes that each country submit data on its 
arms and armed forces to the UN within one month of adoption of such a 
resolution, and that verification be conducted afterward by the UN control 
agency. The USSR has called, also, for a 1-3 cut in all arms. 
The U.S. has opposed prohibition of the atomic weapon on the ground 
that until a system of control is in operation, prohibition would be "unen-
forceable and illusory." It has opposed the 1-3 cut idea because it would 
preserve the present "imbalance" between it and the USSR. The U.S. pro-
poses "balanced reduction" to levels "adequate for defense but not for ag-
gression" and states that the measure of necessary balance can be determined 
only on the basis of verified information as to the existing state of arma· 
ments. 
Question 3. The Baruch plan provides for the elimination of the veto 
power by members of the Security Council on matters of violation (and pun-
ishment) of decisions of the international control agency on the ground that 
if a nation violating the disarmament treaty can veto punishment, then the 
control system is useless. The USSR, on the other hand, has insisted upon 
maintaining the unanimity principle written into the UN Charter and has 
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opposed elimination of the veto power because it fears that the U.S. will use 
its majority support in the UN against the interests of the USSR. 












by int'l agency w h i c h 
will own and manage 
atomic facilities 
by sanctions imposed by 
the UN - elimination of 
veto power 
in stages, starting with 
disclosure and verifica-
tion as "first and indi-
spensable step"; no dis-
armament until Korean 
and other conflicts are 
settled. 
Conference of all states 
to consider treaty when 
Disarmament Commission 
is ready with draft. 
USSR 
national ownership pI u s 
system of continuous in-
spection by int'l agency 
no veto on day to day 
operations of agency but 
veto on sanctions 
immediate ado p t ion of 
p I a n to simultaneously 
prohibit atomic weapons 
and establish control sys-
tem for enforcement. All 
other weapons and armed 
forces 1-3 cut within one 
year subject to verifica-
tion based on census to 
be submitted in 0 n e 
month. 
PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT 
•• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
So far we have considered only barriers to disarmament. Are there 
reasons to think it can be accomplished? Yes!-and one of the best is pro-
vided by the big powers themselves; they are actually moving closer to 
agreement. At the beginning of the whole controversy, East and West were 
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farther apart. But by this time, we can record a number of concessions by 
each side: 
In proposing a census of arms the U.S. has agreed to inclusion of 
atomic arms whereas formerly it opposed its inclusion before. con· 
trol system had been. agreed to. 
Whereas previously the U.S. separated atomic control from convene 
tional arms, it has now agreed to approach disarmament as a uni· 
fied problem The result has been that the Paris UN session com· 
bined the two commissions into one Disarmament Commission which 
now is meeting in New York. The USSR has conceded, first, that 
prohibition of the atom bomb shall become effective simultaneous 
with the establishment of control machinery, whereas it had pre-
viously argued for prohibition first; and, second, it has agreed to 
CONTINUOUS inspection of atomic facHities by the international 
control agency rather than PERIODIC. 
And another good reason to hope that disarmament will be accom-
plished is this: the deadlock over the main issues can be broken if we will 
act to do so. There are effective alternatives to our present policies which 
offer a basis for successful negotiation. 
But before these alternatives can have a fair chance of proper consid-
eration, it is necessary that two things happen: 
1. We must abandon the notion that we can secure peace by strength 
alone; that we can force agreement by a preponderance of arms without hav-
ing to wage war. If our UN representatives are motivated by such a policy, 
then it is likely they will not be constrained to seek a compromise solution 
to the disarmament controversy; rather they will tend to wait until such time 
as we accumulate preponderant force and then "lay down the law" to the 
USSR. 
2. We need to realize that an international disarmament agreement, 
in the nature of the thing, cannot provide absolute safeguards against vio-
lation but only relative ones. Clearly, if our UN representatives refuse to 
compromise for something less than what we conceive to be absolute safe-
guards, then no agreement at all is possible. Point two is related to point 
one-if our idea of an agreement is not accepted then we will compel it by 






PEACE BY STRENGTH CAN LEAD TO WAR 
• 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
How do our European friends view our foreign policy which a State 
Department bulletin summarized as follows: 
Helping to create situations of strength in many parts of the world 
is the Number 1 policy of the United States in the year 1950. This 
pol.icy holds out the best hope of reaching eventual agreement with 
the Soviet Union. 
-OUR FOREIGN POLICY, Dept. of State Publication, Sept. 1950 
In August, 1951, Kent Cooper, head of the Associated Press, 
returned from Europe with the report that "Europe is afraid to 
death of our defense program-afraid it might turn into a aggres-
sive policy." Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the National Steel Corpo-
ration, upon his return from a trip abroad said: 
It is a widely held opinion in Europe that the present conduct of 
the United States will result in war, which helps to explain why we 
receive only half-hearted support from nations which are our natural 
aUies. 
-Statement on our Foreign Situation, Pittsburgh, 1/5/ 51 
Reporting from Europe, J. Alvarez DelVayo, foreign correspondent 
for The Nation, expressed the feelings of European leaders as follows: 
The Americans try to reassure us by saying that the task of creating 
positions of strength has caused difficulty which will disappear as 
the armaments program approaches completion. But what guaranty 
have we that the United States will consider it necessary or advan-
tageous to negotiate with the Russians? May not the desire to de-
liver an ultimatum overrule its al.lies' demand for a negotiated set-
tlement? That question haunts us and overshadows every other cal· 
culation. 
-The Nation, 2/ 9/ 52 
This concern is clearer perhaps, when the logical development of an 
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arms race is considered. Lord Edward Grey, a leading English political figure 
of World War I, summed up the lessons of that holocaust in the following 
words: 
The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to 
war. If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments 
on both sides_ •• _ 
The enormous growth of armaments in. Europe, the sense of inse-
curity and fear caused by them-it was these that made war inevit-
able. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history and the 
lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the in-
terest of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who 
come after us. 
-Twenty-five Years, 1925, Vol. 1, pps. 91-2 
Secretary of State Acheson in apparent contradiction with his own 
policy "that war will not happen if we can create in areas of political tension 
sufficient strength," is compelled to recognize the danger of an outbreak: 
What are we worried about? What we are worried about is that 
large and powerful countries and their associates may so increase 
their armaments and armed forces that other countries will believe 
that aggression is threatened and then they increase their arms and 
armed forces and, in turn, there is another increase. So, there is 
this rise in armed forces and armaments of the various countries 
and an increase-a dangerous increase in tension. 
-Sec'y of State Acheson, Speech to UN, 11/20/51 
Yet President Truman in a remarka'ble White House press confer-
ence on Sept. 20, 1951, gave official sanction to the policy of force when 
he declared that his aim was to create sufficient military strength not only 
to force the Soviet Union and its satellites to keep the peace, but to compel 
these countries to honor their treaty agreements. 
According to the New York Times, its repocter then asked the Presi-
dent whether it would be correct to infer that the U.S. would in future rely 
upon force, rather than diplomacy, in dealing with the Soviet Union. Mr. Tru· 
man replied that, in the existing circumfstances, this was necessarily true, 
adding that he disliked it very much but no longer had any choice in the 
matter. 
James P. Wal"burg, one of our foremost writers on foreign policy, com-
menting upon this press conference, said: . 
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Anyone who read this account must have realized, if he had not 
realized it before, that American. diplomacy had, for the time being 
at least, dedared its complete bankruptcy-that Mr. Truman had, 
in effect, announced a total suspension of diplomacy until rearma-
ment might provide him with sufficient power NOT TO NEGOTI· 
ATE but to enforce agreements. In other words, the President was 
saying that, when we had sufficient force-meaning preponderant 
force-we would not seek compromise but lay down the law. To say 
that we would not make agreements until we had the power to en· 
force them could scarcely mean anything other than lIuntil we have 
the power to dictate what the agreements shall be." 
-How to Co-exlst Without Playing 
the Kremlin's Game, Boston, 1952, p. 206 
How wide is the gap between the policy voiced by the President and 
a direct advocacy of preventive war? What does the President propose to do 
if the Soviet Union does not submit? The President supplies no answer but 
already others have carried this type of thinking to its logical conclusion by 
suggesting that 
Possibly we ought to destroy the Stalin government while we can. 
It could be done within forty-eight hours with terrifying results ••• 
We can polish off the Stalin regime. Have we the stomach for it? 
We have the means. 
-Chicago Tribune, editorial, 6/13/47 
If it is argued that this insanity has nothing in common with the 
thinking of our national leadership, then how account for a Secretary of 
the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, publicly espousing a war of aggression which 
he claimed would 
cast us in a character new to a true democracy-an initiator of a 
war of aggression-it would win for us a proud title-we would 
become the first aggressors for peace. 
-New York Times, 8/26/50 
Not less warlike, is the point of view of John Foster Dulles who wrote 
the GOP foregin policy plank and who, next to Acheson, is prqbably the 
most influential of our diplomats. In a Sun .. Times interview after the Repub-
lican Convention, he was asked: 
"What do you think the principal foreign policy differences between 
Republicans and Democrats wHI be in the campaign?" 
Dulles replied: 
"Liberation versus 'containment' will be the No. 1 issue on whfch 
the two parties are most sharply in conflict and on. which the posi-
tive and dynamic approach of the Republican Party will come into 
headlong collision with the negative, defensive policy of con.taining 
communism-the pol,icy being pursued by the Truman admnistra. 
tion •• • " 
-Sun-Times, 7/12/52 
In the statements quoted above we have seen enunciated a range of 
policy which includes "situations of strength to deter an aggressor," "con-
tainment," "liberation," and "preventive war." To the keepers of our armed 
forces all four may be possible alternatives because all are simply degrees 
of one policy, namely, the use of force to compel agreement. 
If, as Mr. Warburg claims, U.S. policy in the UN disarmament talks 
is one of forcing agreements on our own terms, clearly it would be impos-
sible to secure fair consideration of alternatives for achieving a compromise 
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settlement. In fact, the U.S. representatives are laid open to the charge that 
their function is to stall (the very charge we lay against the Russians) until 
the time we have built a preponderant force. 
The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusion: The policy 
of "peace by strength" is a policy of imposing peace by force which in the 
context of the present circumstances when two world powers are in oppos-
ing camps and it is inconceivable that either will bow to the other, is a pol-
icy which inevitably will bring war-atom bomb war. An imposed peace, 
comes after war; it is imposed ·by the victor over the vanquished. But a 
peace pact, a disarmament treaty as part of a peace pact, is based upon the 
unwillingness to go to war, on the common desire to avoid the awful conse-
quences of war. It is not imposed; it is negotiated, and its earmark is com-
promise, not ultimatum. 
• • 
• • 
THE MYTH OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT 
• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Insofar as the American people have supported, at great cost, a much 
expanded military establishment, they have done so in the belief that this 
was necessary to catch up with the USSR, which after World War n had not 
disarmed, whereas we had. A Quaker committee, which made a thoughtful 
study of our foreign policy, asserts that this does not square with the facts: 
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Another inaccuracy widely believed is that the United States dis-
armed unilaterally after World War II, thereby weakening itself and 
opening the way for Soviet expansion. The fallacy in this is in its 
frame of reference, for while it is true that we demobilized our 
army to a much larger extent than did the Russians, the miUtary 
strength of the United States has never been measured by the size 
of its standing army. For geographic reasons we rely primarily on 
sea and air power, while the Soviet Union is primarily a land pow-
er. If all categories of weapons are included, as they must be in any 
fair analysis of military strength, the theory of America's unilateral 
disarmament collapses. In the years since the war, our production 
of atomic weapons has proceeded at an increasing tempo, accom· 
panied by the maintenance of a far.flung network of air bases and 
the bombing pl.anes necessary for their delivery. Our navy, by far 
the largest in the world, has been maintained on a standby basis. 
In no post.war year has our military budget fallen below eleven bil-





-Steps to Peace, A Quaker View of U.S. 
Foreign Policy, 1951, pps. 48-9 
WHAT CAN A DISARMAMENT TREATY DO? 
• 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
During the de~bate on bacterial warfare at the UN Disarmament Com· 
mission meetings of May 22 and 28, Benjamin V. Cohen explained the U.S. 
failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning gas and bacterial war-
fare, on the grounds that the "paper pledge of some states were valueless." 
He went on to say that: 
The important problem was not a 27 year old Protocol which had 
become obsolete, however, but what nations were willing to do to 
bring about a foolproof system of arms reduction that would include 
the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. 
-UN Bulletin, 6/ 15/ 52 p. 491 
Yet the Geneva Protocol has been kept for 27 yaers marked by innu-
merable wars including World War II. This "paper pledge" appears to have 
contained excellent safeguards since it has met the only real test-history. 
Why has it been kept? Because, when humanity universally rejects a 
method of warfare too horrible to be permitted, even the most warlike gov-
ernment, including the Hitler government, must refrain from using it. It 
does so, not alone because of universal condemnation, but because it knows 
that retaliation would follow. If this has held true for gas and bacterial war-
fare, would it not apply with more strength to atom and H-bombs? 
The guaranty of an international agreement renouncing a particular 
method of warfare lies in the mutual interest of the people of the nations 
party to it to see that it is enforced. 
A simple renunciation, or a pledge not to be the first to use a particu-
lar weapon, therefore, has great weight and importance. Frederick L. Schu-
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man, Professor of International Law at Williams College, addressing the Chi-
cago Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 9, 1950, supported an agreement of 
this kind as a step in the right direction: 
Americans have been conditioned by their leaders to regard any 
arrangement oHering less than one hundred percent security as 
worse than no arrangement at all ••• No complete security can ever 
be had. An atomic arms race, coupled with a treaty not to use 
atomic weapons, save in retaliation, promises a degree of security 
which, though small, is yet above zero. 
Such a very modest step as this taken without iIIusions-could con· 
ceivably contribute toward further steps, toward a slow diminution 
of fear and hate on both sides, and-who can now know?-possibly 
toward the emergence of series of settlements foreshadowing a real 
peace and an eventual world order to keep the peace. 
-Atomic DiplomacYi Deadlock and Prospects, pps. 11-13 
Other voices have spoken in favor of our government taking this step. 
Stating that the H-bomb "is no longer a weapon of war but a means of ex-
termination of whole populations," a group of 12 physicists at Columbia Uni-
versity, several of them prominent in the development of the A-bomb, while 
asking that we exert ourselves to secure an agreement to eliminate weapons 
of mass destruction from the arsenals of nations, called upon the U.S. to 
meanwhile "make a solemn declaration that we shall never use this bomb 
first." (The H-Bomb, p. 127) Citing the fact that "the belligerents during the 
second World War respected the Convention against the use of l>oison gas 
or bacterial weapons according to the Protocol of June, 1925," the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, on April 5, 1950, addressed an appeal 
to the governments of 62 countries asking them to "set to work to reach an 
agreement on the banning of atom weapons ... " 
How fearful the peoples of the world are of a sudden A-bomb war 
is attested to by many observers. Ernest T. Weir, in the speech cited ear-
lier, said in conclusion: 
People in Europe are definitely opposed to use of the atomic bomb. 
In fact, I was quite surprised at the unanimity of this opinion. They 
believe that if the atomic bomb should be used, there would never 
again be any feeling of security left in the world. The President's 
statement a short while ago that the United States was considering 
the use of the atomic bomb was, in itself, a bombshel.1 in Europe 
and really frightening in its effect. 
John Foster Dulles, in a major foreign policy speech delivered to the 
National Conference of Christians and Jews in Ne'w York on May 12, 1952, 
frankly stated: 
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The hard truth is, as my recent visits in both the East and West 
have made clear to me, that many of the peoples of the world have 
less fear of the Red Army than fear that the United itates may 
rashly precipitate atomic warfare against which their population 
centers are utterly defenseless. 
-Christian Science Monitor, 5/14/52 
A simple pledge not to be the first to use the A-bomb or bacterial 
warfare, solemnly taken by the nations before the UN Assembly, and em-
bodied in a written agreement published to all the peoples of the world, 
would do much to allay fear and suspicion and open the way for more elabo-
rate agreements. 
A disarmament agreement, however, is more than a simple pledge. It 
can stop the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, reduce and limit 
other arms and armed forces, and it can provide safeguards against violation 
by a system of control over such prohibition, reduction and limitation. But 
these safeguards, in the very nature of things cannot provide absolute se-
curity because sovereign nations, unlike the citizens of a particular country, 
are not bound by laws and courts of competent jurisdiction, and it appears 
that we will have to live with this situation for some time to come. 
Nevertheless, certain safeguards are possible which offer security of 
considerable value, namely, a system of inspection and warning of possible 
violation. The system must be so devised as to catch the intention to violate 
quickly and to issue timely warning so that the offended nations may prompt-
ly take steps to protect themselves. Essentially the consequences of violation 
are similar to those described for violation of the Geneva Protocol, namely, 
universal condemnation, retaliation, and the adverse reaction of the violating 
nation's people. 
The key importance of warning of possible violation was stressed ' in 
a statement of the Federation of American Scientists calling upon President 
Truman to establish a new committee to review our atomic energy policy 
with a view to "breaking the present stubborn deadlock": 
Our obiective must con.tin·ue to be effective atomic control, includ-
ing thorough-going inspection. But we must consider al.ternative pro-
posals; perhaps proposals without the far-reaching international 
ownership concept, perhaps proposals making greater concession to 
national interests, certainly proposals in which procedural issues 
are subordinate to the simple question of adequacy in giving na. 
tions warning of possible violation. 
-New York Times, 2/ 6/50 
To summarize the two preceding sections: With a change in policy 
from reliance on armed force, to reliance upon diplomacy and negotiations 
to secure agreements and, with acceptance of the premise that a disarmament 
treaty offers relative but not absolute security against violation, the present 
dangerous impasse in the disarmament controversy will yield to compromise 





THE BARUCH PLAN IS DATED 
• 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Since 1946, the U.S. has adhered to the Baruch plan for disarmament 
and A-bomb control. While we have stated our willingness to consider other 
plans, we have not accepted any changes, and we are still pressing for its 
two basic concepts, viz., international ownership of atomic power facilities 
and the abrogation of the veto power of UN Security Council members on 
violations and punishment. These two conditions are made mandatory in the 
plan before we will take the first steps to disarm. 
In presenting the plan, on June 14, 1946, before the UN Atomic En-
ergy Commission, Bernard Baruch said: 
But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons, 
it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guaran .. 
tee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area, but 
against the illegal users of other weapons-bacteriological, biological 
gas-perhaps-why not? against war itself?* 
Of course we now know what Baruch at the time did not, that the 
U.S. would not maintain a monopoly of "winning weapons," and that the 
USSR would have the A-bomb three years later. While many scientists and 
political commentators have recognized that this has completely changed the 
picture, our disarmament policies are still based on Baruch's premises. 
Hanson Baldwin, military writer for the New York Times, is among 
the many who have called our proposals dated: 
We have done nothing to modernize our concepts of atomic energy 
control. The world has been haggling these past years about the 
international control of atomic energy and all its discussions have 
-The implication which has been drawn from this state'ment is that even had the Rus· 
sians accepted the Baruch plan, the U.S. did not contemplate relinquishing its atom 
bombs until it had guarantees against other forms of mass de'struction. The Russians 
charged in the UN debates that the U.S. would always find a good reason for post-
poning the conversion of the bombs on the grounds that either the guarantees were 
insufficient or that a particular weapon had not yet been controlled. 
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been based upon' data that is now dated: 1) United States monopoly 
of the bomb; ••• Some new thinking is in order ••• 
-New York Times, 12/ 2/ 49 
Walter Lippmann in his nationally syndicated column, argued that the 
Baruch plan was based on a complete fallacy and we cannot in good con-
science stand before the world unless we change our proposals to fit the 
new situation: 
••• the Baruch plan', as well as the report of the Acheson-Lilienthal 
board which preceded it, was a miscalculation based on misinforma~ 
tion about the progress of Russia in the field of atomic energy. The 
American plan of 1946-1947 rested on what we now know to have 
been' a complete faUacy-namely that the United States had a mo-
nopoly of the technical processes and means of producing nuclear 
fuels. 
All the terms and conditions attached to the Baruch offer assumed 
that we had such a monopoly, and that if the Russians did not ac .. 
cept the terms and conditions, we would retain the monopoly of the 
bomb for many years to come and that the Russians would not have 
the bomb for many years to come. 
The Russians achieved the bomb within two years of Baruch's pro-
posal. 
15 it not self-evident that if we wish to make proposals for atomic 
peace, while we are involved unavoidably in a race of atomic arma-
ments, then the Acheson-Lilienthal board, or something like it, must 
be I"econvened-and the whole problem re-examined in the light of 
what we know now that we did not know then? 
It really is not good enough for us to stand before the world and 
our own consciences on a plan and a policy which are manifestly 
and demonstrably obsoloete and impracticable. 
No offer of money, no protestations of our good faith, no beating 
of our breasts about the horrors of the heU-bomb, will be a substi-
tute for a deep effort of mind to think out fresh proposals based 
on the actual fact that now there are two atomic powers in the 
world, and ftO longer on'ly one. If we persist in saying that the old 
plan is still our plan, we shall lay ourselves wide open to the charge, 
not only from the Russians but from our friends aU over the world, 
that we are not seriously interested in any plan. 
-Chicago Sun-rimes, 2/ 6/ 50 
David E. Lilienthal, one of the Baruch plan's principal authors, de-
clared in a television interview that his own brain child "couldn't possibly 
be accepted now, and we shouldn't leave it outstanding." (quoted by G€orge 
W. Herald, UN World, Dec. 1951) 
Evidently taking recognition of the mounting demands for a review 
of the Baruch plan proposals, the Department of State on April 28, 1952, 
announced the "formation of a panel of consultants to advise and assist the 
Department of State .. . in connection with the work of the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission." Listed as the consultants are Vannevar Bush, J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, Allen W. Dulles, Joseph E. Johnson and John Dickey. 
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Commenting upon this action, the Alsops, in their column, said: 
The" stated purpose of the new committee is to prepare fresh Ameri-
can proposals for disarmament and atomic energy control" ••• the 
State Department policy makers rather plainly indicated that they 
did not hope for important results but thought a try had to be made 
for the look of things abroad. 
-Chicago Sun-Times, 5/22/ 52 
The question is: will we have new proposals coming from this com-
mittee, or will we have a new look to the old proposals? 
INTE'RNATIONAL OWNERSHIP vs. IN'SPECTION 
The concept of international ownership of atomic facilities requires a 
voluntary surrender of national sovereignty which never has been seen in 
modern history. It could have been contemplated by the authors of the Ba-
ruch plan only because they erroneously considered that the u.s. was in pos-
session of such an awe-inspiring weapon that even the most powerful nations 
would have to yield in the face of it. But not all the drafters of the plan 
were of one mind. Mr. Barnard, for one, expressed his misgivings: 
In 1946 the State Department board of which David E. Lilienthal 
was chairman and I was a member, arrived quickly at agreement 
on a general plan for the intern'ational control of atomic energy. 
Yet it seemed to me at the time that logical and sound as the plan 
was, the chances of its adoption were very small .•• It appeared 
likely that every country, includin'9 our own, would encounter ex-
treme technical and popular difficulties in renouncing that consid· 
erable portion of its national sovereignty which acceptance of the 
contemplated pact would require. 
-Scientific American, Nov. 1949 
Does a system of inspection offer an adequate alternative? Scientists 
who have worked on the atom bomb seem to think so. George W. Herald in 
an article entitled, "How to Stop the A-bomb Race," states that engineers 
and atomic scientists consider that adequate means of inspection can be 
worked out and quotes from a statement of the Geological Society of Ameri-
ca and the American Institute of Mining and Metal Engineers, which in part 
said: 
200 inspectors with appropriate qualifications stationed at known 
world centers of uranium production and several hundred experts 
in total would be able to develop and successfully apply an inter-
national inspection system of nuclear raw materials. 
-UN World, Dec. 1951 
Joining in this position is the Federation of American Scientists 
whose statement quoted earl~er called for abandonment of the international 
ownership concept in favor of a system of inspection geared to giving warn-
ing of possible violation. 
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The Chicago Sun-Times expressed the OpInIOn that nothing in the So-
viet state structure would militate against adequate inspection: 
••• the fuU record of Soviet policy since 1917 suggests that there 
is nothing INHERENT in the ideology or. structure of the Soviet 
state which makes impossible a disarmament pact that could be 
checked and supervised by effective international inspection'. 
- Chicago Sun-Times, editorial, 2/ 27/ 50 
Will the Russ~ans be amenable to negotiating a system of rigorous 
inspection? Will they surrender the limited part of national sovereignty 
which an inspect:.'on system makes necessary? 
•.. The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that it is an ab-
solute natural necessity in certain cases to I,imit to some exten,t, or 
in some part, state sovereignty on the basis of reciprocity and in 
the interests of international cooperation ••• The matter at issue 
is the degree, the extent, the type of limitations .•• 
- Andrei Vishinsky, before Special Political 
Committee of the UN. 11/10/49 
Conclusion: Certainly the U.S. should explore in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union the possibility of establishing an adequate system of inspec-
tion on some basis short of international ownership. 
THE VETO 
The American public has been conditioned to view antagonisti'cally 
the exercise of the veto by the USSR and so its opposition to the Baruch 
proposal IS viewed with hostility. Yet the historical facts prove conclusively 
that the veto power by the permanent members of the Security Council (U.S., 
USSR, Britain, France and China) was written into the UN Charter upon the 
express insistence of the U.S. as well as the USSR. 
The explanation for our position was given by Secretary of State 
George Marshall (May, 1948) to the House Foreign Relations Committee, 
when he said: "We do not want to have our manpower and our strength 
committed by a two-thirds vote." Marshall went on to decry current attempts 
for "the elimination of the veto on enforcement measures." 
The eHmination of the veto, which Bernard Baruch thought would 
make for "international law with teeth in it," does not guarantee against 
violation. This was pointed out by Mr. Baruch's collaborator, Chester I. Bar-
nard: 
Mr. Lillienthal and I personally begged Mr. Baruch not to introduce 
the veto problem •.. when a nation is found violating an agree-
ment of this kind, war has already started. There is no use fool.ing 
with the thing any more, and the debate on veto questions is irrele-
vant. 
-Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, Feb., 1948 
Certainly in the face of an American majority in the UN, the surren-
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der of the veto could not be expected to be acceptable to thE: USSR. John 
Foster Dulles bluntly stated that the u.S. may some day require the veto 
power should the situation reverse itself: 
It has happened so far that a majority in the Security Council has 
been friendly to the Un'ited States, so that our veto has not been 
needed to protect our interests. But it may not always be so; and, if 
it should not be so, certainly the United States would want to have a 
veto power. 
Dulles then went on to hit at the very nub of the question: 
The veto is not merely a check on what could be arbitrary despot· 
ism. It also reflects, rather crudely, a basic reality. At the present 
stage of world development, the United Nations cannot be used to 
coerce any great power. Great powers may be subiect to moral 
pressure; and, as we have seen, they are ..• If the United Nations 
is to reflect the reality of world affairs, one reality is that great 
powers cannot be coerced except through defeat in war. 
-War or Peace, New York, 1950, pps. 195-6 
The UN was established as a continuation of the "Grand Alliance" 
which won the war against the Fascist Axis. Its foundation is the unity of 
the five major powers, and a successful attelllDt to align for war, any com-
bination of powers against one or more of the five, would mean the end of 
the UN as conceived by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. The idea of "collec-
tive securlty," a concept which arose during the pre-World War IT period, 
as a method of combating the Axis powers, cannot be revived through the 
UN. Frederick L. Schuman addressed himself to this question as follows: 
Third, we must come to recognize anew that collective security as 
a means of keeping the peace is an iUusion, that the United Nations 
organization was never designed or intended to be an agency of 
collective security save on the basis of a con'cert of all the Great 
Powers, and that if we would preserve the United Nations as a pos· 
sible basis for future world government, we must think of it and 
deal with it not as a police force to wage war, which it is not and 
can never be, but as a form of discussion and an arena of diplomacy 
for the keeping of the peace. 
-Peace Without Appeasement, an address delivered before the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 3/ 15/51 
The same idea was differently stated by the Commission on World 
Peace of the Methodist Church at its meeting at Evanston, Ill., November 
11-13, 1951: 
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In the move toward disarmament and world order, the United Na-
tions is our best hope. If it is to serve, it must not become the in-
strument of any bloc of nations girding those nations for world-wide 
war. If it is to serve, it must be maintained for all nations, regard-
less of difficulties that may be encountered in arriving at agree-
ment or in securing unan.imity_ 
-From the resolution, IIChallenge to Peacemaking" 
The prevention of a third world war, for which the UN was created, 
is based upon the principle of unanimity of the Great Powers. The restora-
tion of that principle to the full power It enjoyed at the inception of the 
UN is absolutely essential if progress it to be made in strengthening it; in 
fact, If it is to survive at all for the accomplishment of its objective. From 
time to time leading spokesmen in the UN have recognized the need for 
restoration of the unity of the major powers. At the Paris session of the 
UN, the President of France, Vincent Auri'ol, in his opening remarks called 
for private talks among the Big Four to try ot reach agreement on disarma-
ment plans. Sir Benegal Rau of India joined in the suggestion: 
India called for another round of Big Four negotiations and urged 
the major powers to sign a ioint no-war declaration. 
-New York Times, 11/15/51 
Conclusion: Pressure to eliminate the veto power, knowing beforehand 
that this can only drive the USSR and Its supporters from the UN and in 
effect destroy the UN as a peacemaking body, is part of the policy of re-





PACKAGE vs. PIECEMEAL APPROACH 
• 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Throughout the disarmament debate the U.S. has put controls first 
whereas the USSR has put prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and 
disarmament first. The UN Disarmament Commission which 1S now meeting 
in New York, has been deadlocked over this very issue with the U.S. insist-
ing upon a census (disclosure and verification) of all arms as the first step 
to establlshing a control system, and the USSR opposing this proposal on 
the grounds that it would interminably delay prohibition and disarmament. 
While extensive debates are raging over these questions they may 
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well prove to be mInor in importance and will yield to solution once the 
two major issues, ownership of atomic energy and the veto, are resolved. 
The acrimony of the debate is a reflection of the deadlock on the key issues. 
Solution will probably come through a package rather than a piece-
meal approach. Neither controls nor prohlhition will come first, but rather 
a completely negotiated disarmament agreement will more likely be the 
outcome. Such an agreement, or treaty, will contain clauses on the prin-
cipled questions, such as prohibition, as well as the details of execution and 
their order in point of time. It will also contain clauses on the control and 
inspection system. 
Evidently the government of India had something like this in mind 
as instructions for the guidance of its UN delegate Sir Benegal Rau, to be 
introduced should a propitious occasion offer itself during the ParIs ses-
sions. Robert Trumbull of the New York Times reported from New Delhi on 
the main ideas of the IndIan plan: 
In view of the dependence of each group on the supposed superi. 
ority in one classification of armament-the U.S. and its allies in 
atomic weapons and the USSR in manpower and conventional types 
-India believes some rel,ation.ship must be established between' reo 
duction and limitation of both types of weapons. The proposal there· 
fore is made that a louncil be set up to determine the principles 
to govern disarmament. Upon acceptance of these by both sides the 
council would split in two wings. 
(a) one to implement the principles 
(b) the other to conduct inspection and census of existing areas. 
At no stage would either side have cause to fear an over balance 
of strength in favor of the other. This would be accompanied by ap-
plying the principle of coordin'ation in the fol,lowing way: 
1. While the U.S. is reducing the atomic arsenal, there must be 
simultaneous reduction in the Soviet's favorable ration of conven· 
tional weapons. 
2. In order to effect a workable compromise between the two plans, 
concessions will have to be made to the demands of each. 
-New York Times, 11/23/51. Quoted in World Dis· 
armament Plans, publication of the Women's In-
ternational League for Peace and Freedom. 
The Soviet Union's concession to the principle of simultaneity with 






CAN WE TRUST THE RUSSIANS? 
• 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Suppose we answered this question with a "No" and then added that 
neither do the Russians trust us? Just where does this get us? 
There is no proposal that we disarm unilaterally and then trust the 
Russians or anyone else not to take advantage of us. The proposal is for 
disarmament by agreement on a basis which sets up safeguards against vio-
lation. 
It would be wIse for us to recognize that international diplomacy is 
not based upon trust at all but on national sel,f·interest,* and this suggests 
to us that we seek to avoid atomic war. It happens to conform to the national 
self-interest of the USSR, and of all nations. Basically it is this coincidence 
of interest which makes agreement possl!ble. A statement of the Illinois Com-
mittee for Peaceful Alternatives puts the case succinctly: 
There can be no victor in an atomic war. No difference between 
nations can be so great that mutual, ann'ihilation is the only answer. 
The peaceful co-existence of nations having divergent social and 
economic systems is not only possible but imperative. 
-Policy for Peace 
And these words are echoed by a famous atomic scientist: 
When Dr. Oppenheimer, who supervised the creation of the first 
atomic bomb, appeared before a Congressional Committee, he was 
asked if there was any defense against the weapon'. "Certainly/I the 
great physicist replied confidently. "And that is ••• ?" Dr. Oppen. 
heimer looked over the hushed expectant audience, then whispered 
into the microphone, "Peace"! 
-Readerls Digest, Oct., 1951, p. 100 
·"Trust" may be built up between nations as a result of common interests operating 
over a period of time, but even in dealings with "trusted nations," diplomats seek to 
drive the best bargain for the nation they represent. 




In summary we list the principal conclusions reached in this Guide: 
1. That we are engaged in an accelerating arms race which, if un-
checked, will inevitably lead to atomic war. 
2. That in order to relieve the tension and provide a better atmos-
phere for negotiations, the U.S. pledge that it will not be first to use atomic 
or bacterial weapons if the USSR will make a similar pledge. 
3. That in order to break the six-year deadlock in disarmament ne-
gotiations, it is Incumbent on our side to explore alternatives to our present 
proposals; that before these alternatives can receive proper consideration we 
must change our policy of reliance on force and situations of strength, to 
reliance upon diplomacy and negotiation; and that we should recognize that 
a disarmament agreement while giving us a measure of security cannot by 
its nature offer absolute guarantees against violation. 
4. That we recognize that the basis for success in negotiatIon is the 
mutuality of interest of the U.S., the USSR, and of all nations, in avoiding 
an atom bomb war. 
5. That the Baruch proposals are outmoded; that the concept of in-
ternational ownership should be replaced with proposals for an adequate 
system of inspection and warning of possible violation.: that the J)rol)osal for 
eliminatiOn of the veto power should be relinquished and be replaced with 
measures for strengthening the cooperation of the major powers with a view 
to restoring the peace-making functions of the UN. 
SUGGE'STIONS FOR FURTHER READING: 
World Disarmament Plans, The Committee for World Disarmament 
and World Reconstruction, Women's InternatlOnal League for Peace 
& Freedom, 2006 Walnut St., Philadelphia 3, Pa. 
Toward Security Through Disarmament, American Friends Service 
Committee, 20 S. 12th St., PhiladelphIa 7, Pa. 
• • • 
WHAT YOU CAN DO 
• 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
liThe on!! dear result of the long, intricate, and bitter de-bate on 
disarmament was to underline heavily the importan'Ce of pubBic 
opinion." 
-A. M. Rosenthal, UN correspondent for the N.Y. Times. in 
UN WORLD, April 1952 
What you do helps make public OpInIOn. Here are some suggestions 
for registering opinion so that it counts: 
1. Discuss the subject of disarmament with your neighbors and in your 
organizations. 
2. Summarlze your view points, if not in toto, then partially, and to 
the extent agreement can be reached, send them to the President, the 
Secretary of state, your Senators and Congressmen. 
3. Send a copy to your newspapers in the form of a letter to the editor 
or as a release. 
4. As events transpire, express yourself in appropriate ways to your 
repre'sentatives in Congress and the UN and to the newspapers. 
5. There are peace organizations throughout the country; encourage 
them in every way you can. The CommIttee for Peaceful Alternatives is one 
such organization. Your membership and/or contribution will help in its 
work. Write to: 
COM'MITTEE FOR P'EACEFUL ALTERNATIVES 
30 N'ORTH DEA'RBORN CHI'CAGO 2. ILL. 
AdditiOnal copies of this pamphlet are 25c, or 15c each for orders of 
12 or more. ~@ 

